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A COMPARISON OF ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM IN THE
UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
CLIONA J. M. KIMBER*
INTRODUCTION
The United States (U.S.) and the European Union (E.U.) are two
vast, industrialised, and socially developed entities where protection of
the environment is high on the political agenda.1 Yet the size of their
territories and the huge physical and geographical differences be-
tween regions creates particular problems for both entities as to how
best to protect the environment. Additionally, the nature of the polit-
ical and administrative structures in both entities sometimes results in
power struggles between central and regional authorities regarding
environmental protection. This Article will compare these legal struc-
tures in the U.S. and the E.U. in order to establish a set of conclusions
concerning the problems of environmental federalism. Part I will out-
line the general advantages and disadvantages common to a central
approach to environmental problems in any regional entity. In Part II
the historical origin and basic structure of the E.U. will be contrasted
with that of the U.S. in order to illuminate 'the background against
which both systems may be examined. The direct comparison of both
entities will commence in Part III with an examination of the legisla-
tive competencies of the respective central institutions. The compari-
son will continue in Parts IV and V with an examination of legislative
instruments and enforcement respectively. In Part VI this Article will
draw final conclusions as to the nature of environmental federalism in
both systems.'
* Faculty of Law, University of Aberdeen; LL.B., Trinity College, Dublin; LL.M., Uni-
versity of British Columbia; MA, Trinity College, Dublin.
1. The E.U. is made up of 15 countries with a combined population of 372 million.
In 1994, the combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the E.U. was $7 trillion. Frank
Viviano, Borders Without Patrols, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 19, 1995, at 1. The GDP of the U.S. is
about $6 trillion. William Flannery, Whatever Happened to 'Huge Sucking Sound, ST. Louis
POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 25, 1994, at 3..
2. It is important at the outset to recognise that there is no acceptance among legal
and political scholars as to the precise meaning of a "federation." The term can be used to
describe either a union of provinces where sovereignty has been ceded to a central body or
a loose alliance of independent countries similar to a confederation. For a discussion of
the differing aspects of federalism, see Trevor C. Hartley, Federalism, Courts and Legal Sys-
tems: The Emerging Constitution of the European Communities, 34 AM. J. COMp. L. 229 (1986);
Koen Lenaerts, Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 205
(1990).
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I. ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM-GENERAL ADVANTAGES AND
DISADVANTAGES
In any large region, questions will arise as to whether measures to
protect the environment should be adopted at a central or regional
level, and what the relative advantages and disadvantages of each ap-
proach might be. The advantages and disadvantages to central regula-
tion for environmental protection are common to all systems and are
present in both the U.S. and the E.U. These general considerations
will be discussed in order to create a framework against which the
specific problems of environmental federalism in the E.U. and the
U.S. may be assessed. For the purpose of this discussion it will be con-
venient to consider these advantages and disadvantages of centralised
regulation under three headings: environmental, economic, and
political.'
A. Advantages of Centralised Regulation
There are certain situations in which the environment is better
protected with one set of measures taken by a central regulator than
through a proliferation of measures by a number of regional actors.
Where there are multi-jurisdictional problems-where rivers flow
through a number of countries or states, or hazardous waste is trans-
ported through a number of regions-a transnational or trans-state
solution is preferable. A central authority is more capable of negotiat-
ing solutions between bordering entities and imposing a remedy
where agreement is not forthcoming. The nature of other problems,
such as the destruction of the ozone layer or the conservation of large
habitats or the protection of highly migratory species, often highlight
the limitations of isolated and patchwork regional measures which
may not be able to provide real solutions. The opportunity to take a
centralised overview and create solutions on a broader canvas can be
of clear benefit for the protection of the environment. For these types
of global problems, the greater the number of entities acting in con-
cert, the greater the likelihood that the environment can be
protected.
An additional advantage of centralised environmental measures
is that often more stringent measures are possible. This may be attrib-
3. The following discussion relies on ECKHARD REHBINDER & RICHARD STEWART, 2 INTE-
GRATION THROUGH LAW: EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE ch. 1 (1985) (En-
vironmental Protection Policy); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice: Problems of
Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE LJ.
1196 (1977); W.P.J. Wils, Subsidiarity and EC Environmental Policy: Taking People's Concerns
Seriously, 6J. EwrrL. L. 85 (1994).
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utable to a number of factors such as the relative insulation of central
actors from local and short-term political accountability, and the pos-
sibility of persuading less aware regions to agree to stricter measures
by promising gain in other areas.
Economic considerations also have a large role to play in favoring
a central approach to regulation of the environment. An important
part of any system seeking to protect the environment is the regula-
tion of industrial and other economic activity. This may be achieved
by setting limits on the emissions from industrial plants, mandating
the use of particular types of technology or processes which generate
less pollution, and setting standards for the types of goods produced,
for example requiring that glass containers be recyclable or prohibit-
ing the use of styrofoam packaging. If the regions in a large entity
each take their own approach to such matters, several types of
problems may arise. Non-uniform regulation of products in different
regions may lead states or countries with high national environmental
standards to exclude products which do not conform to these stan-
dards. Such barriers to trade can be damaging for consumer and in-
dustrial welfare. Similarly, regions which set high and costly standards
for the operation of industrial processes in order to protect the envi-
ronment may find themselves at a competitive disadvantage. Industry
may exert pressure on state or national governments to exclude prod-
ucts from competitor regions which do not have to bear these costs.
Alternatively, industry may seek to ease the burden of regulation in
their home region at the expense of protecting the environment. If,
however, environmental measures are harmonised at a central level,
trade barriers caused by the exclusion of products which do not con-
form to high environmental standards will no longer be necessary,
and, therefore, competitive distortions caused by differing regulation
of industrial processes can be eliminated.4
The economies of scale which accrue from centralised environ-
mental regulation can result in financial advantages for both central
and regional governments. It is more efficient if research and devel-
opment is undertaken by one large, well equipped agency which is
staffed with trained persons rather than many small agencies which
may duplicate each other's efforts. As a result, projects which might
be too costly to finance if undertaken by one region may be possible if
undertaken in association with a number of regional actors. Similar
advantages result where one central agency is responsible for certain
4. See ANTHONY OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL FoRM AND ECONOMic THEORY 166-68
(1994).
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types of activities, such as product regulation. The existence of multi-
ple regulatory regimes can lead to considerable diseconomies of scale
in terms of administrative burdens, training of personnel, and acquisi-
tion of technology and know-how.5
Political factors may also make it more likely that action will be
taken at the centre. The most obvious of these is simply the desire of
the centre to assume more power to itself. This does not necessarily
benefit the environment. However, regions may also find that one of
the political advantages of centralised regulation is that a common
position can be presented in international negotiations concerning
the adoption of environmental treaties or policies. Regions acting in
concert can often achieve a greater bargaining power than would be
possible were the regions acting independently. For example, a col-
lective unit may extract greater commitments from other nations to
take measures to protect the global environment, such as the reduc-
tion of fish catches or the prevention of traffic in endangered species.
Moreover, centralised enforcement of environmental regulation may
be more successful because it can be more disinterested. There is a
danger that regional entities are more sympathetic to the demands of
developers and industrialists for concessions or lenience in enforce-
ment, particularly where a choice arises between continuing eco-
nomic growth and protection of the environment.6
B. Disadvantages of Centralised Regulation
Sound environmental policy strikes a careful balance between
economic growth and the protection of the environment.7 In a large
region there are often vast differences in geographical, ecological,
and industrial conditions. As a result, pollution assimilates at differ-
ent rates and environmental quality may vary greatly. Because of their
knowledge of the local environment, regions may be in a better posi-
tion to assess local environmental needs, local environmental conse-
quences of certain levels of pollution, and locally appropriate
remedies. This may result in a more contextually appropriate balance
between protection of the environment and development. Uniform
standards set at a central level may lead to excessive control in some
areas and insufficient control in others. For these reasons, land use
5. iL at 179.
6. Id. at 94.
7. Such a balance is embodied in the concept of sustainable development, see OuR
COMMON FUTURE, REPORT OF THE WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
(1987) (Brundtland Report).
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and planning are better regulated by regions rather than from the
centre.
Regions may also be more aware of the unique problems and
needs of their locality than a central authority might be. Regions may
be quicker to discover and perhaps more concerned about the protec-
tion of a particular habitat or the abatement of pollution at a given
site. If environmental protection takes place purely at the centre,
there is a danger that such specific local problems might be over-
looked completely or not be considered until the damage already has
been done.
Although there are potential economies of scale in centralised
environmental regulation, economic factors can cut both ways, and in
some cases, they may lead to inefficiencies. The most obvious eco-
nomic disadvantage is the cost of bureaucracy. A centralised adminis-
tration may lead to a bloated and costly over-accumulation of
bureaucracy. In addition, centralised protection of the environment
of a large number of regions requires substantial information transfer
from the regions to the centre, which may result in duplication of
effort, and failures of communication which may prove costly and
inefficient.
Finally, the problems caused by a number of political and struc-
tural factors may lead to central regulation being disadvantageous for
the protection of the environment. Regional resentment of central-
ised control may produce substantial political difficulties, particularly
if the regions are highly independent. The ceding of power to the
centre may be seen as a diminution of the region's sovereignty and
independence. If centralised standards are imposed upon reluctant
regional actors, local implementation and enforcement may be possi-
ble, and the goals of the centre will be undermined.8 Harmonising
measures where legal and administrative systems vary considerably
from region to region can be extremely difficult. Given these regional
differences, the successful adoption of uniform central standards may
be difficult to achieve.9 Finally, real differences may exist between lo-
calities in preferences regarding levels of environmental protection
and the means of achieving environmental goals. As a consequence,
it may be difficult for the central government to create a body of legis-
lation which adequately reflects these preferences, and the result may
be that the regions' support for central environmental regulation is
8. See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
9. For a description of the effect of such difficulties on the process of harmonisation
in Europe, see PAUL BEAUMONT & STEPHEN WEATHERILL, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw ch. 17
(1993).
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reduced. There is a danger that this would have a significant negative
impact on the effectiveness of central environmental legislation.
II. COMPARISON OF THE POLITICAL STRUCTURES OF THE E.U. AND
THE U.S.
Having considered the advantages and disadvantages of central
regulation in federal systems in general, this Article will now consider
the political structures in the E.U. and the U.S. in more detail. To
understand and compare environmental federalism in the E.U. and
the U.S., there must be some understanding of the political structures
of both entities. Even at first glance it is clear that the dissimilarities
between both entities are as great as the similarities. The E.U. is not a
nation-state in any accepted sense of the word. Rather, it is an associa-
tion of sovereign independent states which have agreed to act collec-
tively in a number of selected areas with a central authority which
formulates law by which member states agree to be bound. Each
member state of the E.U. has a strong national identity; a strong sense
of national pride; its own sovereign parliament; its own legal, adminis-
trative, and judicial system; and its own currency and central bank.
Each member state of the E.U. exhibits differing levels of commit-
ment to the E.U., and differing levels of development, industrialisa-
tion, wealth, and infrastructure. Some countries are highly developed
and industrialised, while others are relatively poor and will require
substantial growth to equal the prosperity of the richer countries.
Many nation-states view their membership in the Union largely in
terms of the benefits that can be derived for the country itself. Profes-
sor Weiler points out that
the Community is conceived in this way of thinking not as a
redefinition of the national self but as an arrangement, elab-
orate and sophisticated, of achieving long-term maximisation
of the national interest in an interdependent world. Its value
is measured ultimately and exclusively with the coin of na-
tional utility and not community solidarity."l
The status of the E.U. itself as a political and legal entity is still evolv-
ing and is still uncertain in many respects. While the European Com-
munity (EC) Treaty recognises the Community as a separate entity
with a legal personality and treaty making powers,"1 each state retains
10. J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2481 (1990). The
United Kingdom is a classic example of a state which takes this view.
11. See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrIY [EC TREATY] arts. 113, 114, 131,
228, 237, 238 (incorporating changes made by TEU, infra note 12).
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its status as a subject of international law. The EC Treaty expressly
provides that "the Union shall respect the national identities of its
Member States."1 2 Attempts to give the institutions of the E.U. more
powers, or to move further along the road to a federal Europe are
continually resisted by some member states. At best, the member
states live in an uneasy tension between their view of themselves as
autonomous and independent countries and a conception of them-
selves as part of a larger union. Professor Weiler has described this
tension as resulting from "each state actor's need to reconcile the re-
flexes and ethos of the "sovereign" national state with new modes of
discourse and a new discipline of solidarity."13 Such tensions can only
increase with the proposed enlargement of the E.U. to include coun-
tries in Eastern Europe.
These tensions and perceptions help to explain why the voting
procedure for the adoption of central measures of any kind, and envi-
ronmental measures in particular, is such a large obstacle to central
action. Prior to the adoption of the Treaty on, European Union
(TEU), all environmental legislation had to be adopted by the unani-
mous vote of all member states. A parallel situation in the U.S. would
require the agreement of each state governor for the enactment of
federal environmental legislation. The requirement of unanimity is
quite clearly a substantial constraint on both the type and the strin-
gency of environmental measures which can be adopted by the Com-
munity. The European Council, which adopts environmental
measures, is composed of representatives of the governments of mem-
ber states who often act in the interests of their own countries. If an
environmental measure is one for which unanimity is required, a sin-
gle member state may veto the measure. Even if only a qualified ma-
jority is required to adopt a measure, member states can operate in
concert to block a measure that they do not feel is in their interest. It
is therefore far more difficult for the Community to adopt a measure
against the will of a member state than it is for the U.S. government to
act with less than unanimous support among the states. In addition,
E.U. institutions enacting environmental legislation must always bear
in mind member state reluctance to agree to any measures which in-
volve too great a diminution of their sovereignty. As one commenta-
tor has remarked, "in order to have some valid comparison,
American[s] . . . should imagine having environmental standards set
12. See TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION [TEUI art. F(1) (amending TREATY ESTABLISHING
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [EEC TREATY].
13. Weiler, supra note 10, at 2480.
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by the Organisation of American States against the United States." 14
While this provision of the EEC Treaty has been amended by the TEU
so that the majority of environmental legislation is now adopted by
qualified majority voting, 5 measures in several areas still require una-
nimity. These include provisions of a fiscal nature; measures concern-
ing town and country planning and land use-with the exception of
waste management and measures of a general nature; management of
water resources; member state choice of energy sources and supply.16
The range of environmental matters that could potentially come
within the ambit of these exceptions is clearly quite large. Central
action in these important areas is therefore constrained by the need
to obtain the approval of every member state of the E.U., a require-
ment which has important consequences for environmental federal-
ism in Europe. Such approval will only become less easy to obtain as
the E.U. expands.
This state of affairs would be even more difficult were it not for
the presence of a number of factors which tend to secure agreement
from member states which might be initially reluctant to agree to envi-
ronmental measures.17 First, member states may reach agreement
through a process of reciprocal concessions at a political level over a
period of time. States for which environmental protection is a lower
priority may agree to relatively stringent environmental measures in
order to secure goodwill which may be transferred to measures of an-
other nature in the future. States are reluctant to acquire a reputa-
tion for being uncooperative in a political structure which requires
considerable horse-trading to arrive at a final position. As a conse-
quence, it may be difficult to oppose Commission proposals unless
they would clearly cause substantial economic or domestic political
difficulty. Second, member states have differing influences on EC pol-
icy-making through the voting procedure. The decision-making pro-
cedure for many environmental measures now requires a qualified
majority, so unanimity is not required in all circumstances.' Third, it
is to the advantage of multinational firms which have facilities in more
than one member state to have standards harmonised throughout the
E.U. so that they are operating under the same conditions in all coun-
tries. Other firms operating in countries with high environmental
14. See Ludwig Kramer, The European Economic Community, in U.S. AND EUROPEAN ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW, supra note 38, at 4-5.
15. EC TRAr.Y art. 130S(1).
16. Id. arts. 100A, 130S(2).
17. REHBINDER & STEWART, supra note 3, at 12-13.
18. EC TREATY arL 130S(1); see YVONNE SCANNELL, ENVIRONMENTAL AND PLANNING LAW
8 (1995).
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standards would wish to have standards harmonised at that level, if
only to ensure that their competitors are put at an equal disadvantage.
Therefore, industry may exert pressure on governments to agree to
particular environmental measures. Fourth, political leaders may find
it convenient to use the fiction of being bound by. their membership
in the Community to adopt environmental controls which they wish to
adopt but believe would not command the support of voters at home.
The lack of domestic political accountability for decisions taken at
Community level substantially enhances the freedom of member
states. As Rehbinder and Stewart put it: "By acquiescing in Commis-
sion initiatives, they can secure their objectives through the back
door."19 Finally, substantial non-compliance with environmental
measures by member states paradoxically works in favour of the agree-
ment of states to environmental measures. States may agree to Com-
mission proposals for the purpose of securing the goodwill of other
member states, safe in the knowledge that implementation of these
measures can be delayed and minimised."
Quite apart from the looseness of the political structure, a crucial
factor in understanding environmental federalism in Europe is the
historic origin of the E.U. as an economic entity. The origin of the
current Union is the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)
which was established in 1951.21 The objective of the ECSC was the
organisation of the production of coal and steel under a single au-
thority in order to ensure that peace was maintained between some of
the larger European States.22 The ECSC was deepened in 1957 with
the Treaty of Rome 23 establishing the European Economic Commu-
nity and Euratom. 24 Although the aspirations of some of the founders
of the Community extended beyond the establishment of a common
market,25 the Treaty of Rome in 1957 quite clearly established a
purely economic community, which was essentially an extended cus-
toms union, rather than a Federation of Europe. The Treaty of Rome
and thus the European Community has since been successively modi-
19. REHBINDER & STEWART, supra note 3, at 13.
20. Id. at 316.
21. TREATY ESTABUSiHING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY [ECSC TirATY].
22. Id. pmbl.
23. See EEC TREATY, supra note 12.
24. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY [EURATOM
TREATY].
25. In 1955, at the meeting of the foreign ministers of the member states of the Coal
and Steel Community, the ministers declared their intention to pursue the development of
a United Europe. See D. LASOK & J.W. BRIDGE, LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES 12 (D. Lasok & K.P.E. Lasok eds., 6th ed. 1994).
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fled and deepened, first with the Merger Treaty in 1965,6 then by the
Single European Act in 1986 (SEA) 27 and most recently by the Treaty
on European Union in 1992 (TEU),28 otherwise known as the Maas-
tricht Treaty.29 The Union has also widened with the accession of
nine new members to bring the total membership up to fifteen.
The Community's objectives and competencies have developed
beyond the purely economic on an incremental basis with each suc-
cessive modification of the Treaty of Rome. This development has
taken place in a piecemeal and patchwork fashion, based in part on
an expansive and imaginative interpretation of the treaties by the
Court of Justice of the European Communities. For example, the
Union only gained an explicit competence to regulate the environ-
ment with the adoption of the Single European Act in 1986.0 Prior
to this, environmental regulation was only justified as part of measures
to promote "an harmonious development of economic activities""1 or
for the attainment of the operation of the common market. While
the TEU considerably extended the explicit competencies of the
Union beyond purely economic matters, it is probably fair to say that
the chief objectives of the Union and indeed its raison dlitre continue
to be the furthering of economic and social progress.3 2 As a result,
26. Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European
Communities, April 8, 1965, 4 I.L.M. (1965) (amending EEC TaRATY).
27. Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1 [hereinafter SEA].
28. See supra note 12.
29. There are three legally definable treaty-based Communities: the European Coal
and Steel Community, Euratom, and the European Community. These three Communi-
ties operate under the umbrella concept of the European Union. Article A of the TEU
provides: "[B]y this treaty, the High Contracting Parties establish among themselves a Eu-
ropean Union, hereafter called 'The Union.'" TEU art. A. These three Communities con-
stitute one of the three pillars of the E.U.; the other two are the Common Foreign and
Security Policy, and Co-operation in Justice and Home Affairs. These latter two pillars
supplement the existing treaties through the establishment of a detailed framework for co-
operation on an intergovernmental basis. These three pillars are topped by a common
edifice, the European Union. Martin Hession & Richard Macrory, Maastricht and the Envi-
ronmental Policy of the Community: Legal Issues of a New Environment Policy, in LEGAL ISSUES OF
THE MAAsTR cHT Tar.Av 151 (David O'Keefe & Patrick Twomey eds., 1994).
The Union, therefore, refers to the physical territory of all of the member states, or to
the member states acting other than under the EC Treaty. The Community refers to mem-
ber states acting under the EC Treaty. The Court ofJustice of the European Communities
has jurisdiction over the European Communities, not the Union, as many matters in the
TEU are not justiciable. See generally ANDREW CHARLESWORTH & HOLLY CULLEN, EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAw 8-10 (1994); LASOK & BRIDGE, supra note 25, ch. 2.
30. See supra note 27.
31. Declaration of the Council of Ministers of the European Communities and of the
Representatives of the Governments of the Member States Meeting in Council, 1973 O.J.
(C 113) 1.
32. See TEU art. B.
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there is a danger that the protection of the environment can be
subordinated to the furtherance of the economic principles and
objectives central to the Union."3 This understanding is crucial to any
consideration of environmental federalism in the E.U.
The U.S., in contrast, has a much longer history of both political
and economic union. Since the adoption of the Constitution of the
United States in 1789, the states have integrated to an extent unfore-
seen by the founders. Indeed, it is arguable whether the U.S. is even
correctly classed as a federation; it now seems more appropriately de-
scribed as a nation-state.3 4 The legal identity of the U.S. at the inter-
national level has subsumed that of the individual states. At a political
level, the federal institutions are long established, powerful, and rela-
tively certain of their position. Indeed, at an institutional level, there
is little comparison between the strength of the U.S. federal institu-
tions and government and the embryonic development of the central
institutions of the E.U. In the U.S., the boundaries of the competen-
cies of the federal and state governments have been litigated for al-
most two centuries, and while the questions cannot be said to be
settled, 5 the E.U. has only begun to examine questions of the compe-
tency of the Community institutions vis a vis the sovereignty of mem-
ber states. In the U.S., the unilateral secession of a state from the
Union is impossible as a matter of constitutional law. 6 In the E.U.,
however, it is a possibility, although an unlikely one, for some states
which resent any diminution of their sovereignty resulting from mem-
bership of the E.U. In the U.S., citizens have a strong sense of identity
as citizens of the nation, whereas in the E.U. the identity of citizens is
derived from citizenship of the member states in which they live.
It is clear from the above comparison that there are widely differ-
ing levels of political integration in both systems. It is also clear that
such a situation must have an effect on the shaping of environmental
federalism. Considerable political and legal integration had taken
place in the U.S. prior to the advent of extensive environmental regu-
33. This argument has also been made as regards the social policy of the Community
and, in particular, the provision relating to sex discrimination. See TAMARA K. HARVEY,
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR SEx DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT (1995).
34. ERNEST C. GRIFFITH, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 21 (1976).
35. See Peter M. Manus, Federalism Under Siege at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal: Pre-emption
and (ERCLA after United States v. Colorado, 19 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 327 (1994) (discussing
the federal power of preemption).
36. See Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700 (1 Wall.) 726 (1868) ('Consideration therefore as
transactions under the Constitution, the ordinance of succession, adopted by the conven-
tion and ratified by a majority of citizens of Texas, and all the acts of her legislature in-
tended to give effect to that ordinance, were absolutely null.").
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lation. As a result, federal institutions in the U.S. responsible for regu-
lating the environment are, for the most part, interacting with
relatively similar legal and administrative systems in each state. It is
easier, therefore, for the U.S. to engage in central regulation than it is
for the E.U. In Europe, member states had begun to regulate for the
protection of the environment before the moves towards European
integration took place. In Britain, for example, atmospheric pollu-
tion had been regulated by a series of Alkali Acts since 1863."7 As a
result, European states developed distinctive national styles of regula-
tion influenced by their differing legal, administrative, and political
traditions."8 One can see, then, why there is more extensive central
regulation of the environment in the U.S. than in the E.U. The fed-
eral government in the U.S. is in a stronger political and institutional
position to enact environmental legislation than the E.U. As a result,
there is less central regulation of the environment in the E.U. than in
the U.S., and the legislative measures that are in place in Europe are
less extensive and less systematic. This conclusion will become more
apparent as this Article examines other facets of both systems.
III. LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCIES
The Treaty of Rome which founded the European Economic
Community contained no explicit legal basis for Community environ-
mental policy. Nevertheless, the European Court, by expansively in-
terpreting the provisions of the original Treaty, established a legal
basis for Community action in this area. Until the adoption of the
SEA in 1986, Community environmental policy was based on only two
competencies: First, the power under Article 100 to approximate or
harmonise laws in the member states which affect the functioning of
the common market.3 9 Second, under Article 235, the power to take
appropriate measures to attain, in the course of operation of the com-
37. See Lakshman Guruswamy, Integrating Thoughtways: Ro-Opening of the Environmental
Mind?, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 463, 501 n.176 (discussing the recycling of hydrogen chloride
pollutants into useful commercial bleach in Britain at the time of the first Alkali Act in
1863).
38. See DAVID VOGEL, NATIONAL STYLES OF REGULATION: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN
GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES (1986); Contrasting Constitutiona4 Institutional and
Administrative Frameworks-The Implications for Environmental Poliey-making, panel discussion
in UNDERSTANDING U.S. AND EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: A PRACrITIONER'S GUIDE 59
(Turner T. Smith & Pascale Kromarek eds., 1989) [hereinafter U.S. AND EUROPEAN ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAw].
39. EC TREATY art. 100. Article 100 provides:
The Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and
after consulting the European Community and the Economic and Social Commit-
tee, issue directives for the approximation of such laws, regulations or administra-
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mon market, one of the objectives of the Community where the
Treaty had not provided the necessary powers.4" However, these Arti-
cles limited the ability of the E.U. to take environmental action be-
cause these types of measures had to be linked to the functioning of
the common market and related economic activities. Within the SEA
and the subsequent TEU, the Community was given explicit legal
competence in environmental matters.41 The Community's capacity
to take such action was further strengthened by the inclusion of the
promotion of sustainable growth respecting the environment as a
principal objective.42
The E.U., therefore, has explicit competence to take legislative
measures for the regulation of the environment under explicit author-
ity in addition to its power to harmonise laws in member states and to
promote the efficient functioning of the common market. It does not
have exclusive competence in this area, however, as it exercises these
powers concurrently with the member states.4" Under this system of
shared authority, the member states retain the power to regulate the
environment within the limits set by the EC Treaty until such time as
the Community acts. Once the Community acts, it then assumes ex-
clusive competence in the field it has occupied.' Concurrent Com-
munity and member state competence is thus transformed into
tive provision of the Member States as directly affect the establishment or
functioning of the Common Market.
Id.
40. Id. art. 235. Article 235 states:
If action by the community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the
operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community and
this treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unani-
mously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European
Parliament, take the appropriate measures.
Id.
41. Id. arts. 130R-T (setting forth community environmental policy).
42. Id. art. 2. Article 2 provides: "The Community shall have as its task... to promote
throughout the Community a harmonious and balanced development of economic activi-
ties, sustainable and non-inflationary growth respecting the environment. . . ." Id.
43. This general rule is subject to some minor exceptions. The Court ofJustice of the
European Communities has declared from time to time that certain matters are within the
exclusive competence of the Community. As far as the environment is concerned, meas-
ures taken under the common commercial policy or regarding marine fisheries conserva-
tion are probably within the exclusive competence of the Community. The matter has not
yet been finally decided. See Case 104/81, Mainz v. Kupferberg, [1982] E.C.R. 3641; Case
804/79, Commission v. United Kingdom, [1980] E.C.R. 1045; see also Hession & Macrory,
supra note 29, at 160-61.
44. The extent of this power depends, of course, on the scope of the field. See Case
237/82,Jongeneel Kaas, [1984] E.C.R. 483.
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exclusive Community competence; member state action is preempted
by Community action.45
With regard to environmental measures, there are at least two
exceptions to the doctrine relating to preemption. The EC Treaty ex-
pressly provides for member state action notwithstanding concurrent
Community action in certain circumstances. First, Article 100A allows
member states to maintain, but not to introduce, measures in deroga-
tion of community harmonisation measures under Article 100, pro-
vided they do not constitute arbitrary discrimination or a disguised
restraint on trade between member states. 46 Second, Article 130T ex-
pressly provides for the maintenance or introduction of more strin-
gent measures for the protection of the environment by member
states to the extent that they are not incompatible with the Treaty.47
The type and scope of environmental measures a member state
may maintain or introduce under these exceptions remain unclear,
however. The shape of these exceptions will ultimately turn on the
interpretation of the phrases "arbitrary discrimination," "a disguised
restraint on trade," and "incompatible with the Treaty." One must ask
then, how could environmental measures have these effects? It is pos-
sible that member state adoption of product standards; legislation reg-
ulating industrial processes; or policies providing state aids, financial
incentives, or subsidies to help protect the environment could be in-
compatible with Treaty provisions prohibiting measures restraining
the free movement of goods,48 and provisions establishing rules on
competition and curtailment of state aids to industry.49 We can only
say, however, that national environmental measures could be incompat-
ible with these Treaty provisions because a closer examination of these
same provisions reveals further exceptions."0 For example, although
national measures which have the effect of restricting the free move-
ment of goods between member states are prohibited by the Treaty,
such restrictions are permissible on certain specified grounds, includ-
ing the protection of health and life of humans, animals, or plants.51
45. See Stephen Weatherill, Beyond Pre-emption? Shared Competence and Constitutional
Change in the European Community, in LEGAL ISsUES OF THE MAAsricHT TREATY, supra note
29, at 14. However, Weatherill notes that in practice harmonising directives often include
safeguard procedures permitting member states to take action in accordance with "defined
procedures in the directive where a threat to health not covered by the terms of the direc-
tive is revealed." Id. at 19-21.
46. EC TRErTv art. 100A.
47. Id. art. 130T.
48. Id. arts. 30-36.
49. Id. arts. 85-94.
50. Id. arts. 30-36.
51. See LUDWIG KRAMER, EC TR.ATY AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 112 (1995).
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This exception has been somewhat clarified by case law which has in-
terpreted the Treaty to permit measures taken for the protection of
the environment which had the effect of restricting the free move-
ment of goods. These measures were held not to violate the Treaty
because they were non-discriminatory and proportional to the objec-
tive to be achieved.52 The unarguable conclusion is that a member
state cannot tell at a glance when it has competence to maintain or
introduce environmental measures which are at variance with Com-
munity measures. It is also apparent that, in many cases, Community
environmental legislation provides minimum standards leaving mem-
ber states to adopt more stringent measures notwithstanding the at-
tendant consequences for a homogenous central body of
environmental legislation.
The principle of subsidiarity is a further restraint on the compe-
tence of Community institutions to take environmental measures, par-
ticularly where there is concurrent competency. This somewhat vague
and ambiguous principle was introduced into the EC Treaty by the
Maastricht Treaty and is now contained in Article 3B of the EC
Treaty.53 It has been the subject of much discussion and debate both
by academics 4 and by Community institutions.55 While it lacks preci-
sion at the margins, the core of the principle requires that the Com-
munity act only if the objectives of a proposed action cannot be
sufficiently achieved by the member states, and are, because of the
scale or effects of the proposed action, better achieved by the Commu-
nity. The potential of the principle of subsidiarity to limit Community
action are yet to be determined. Much will depend on the extent to
which the principle is justiciable and available to member states chal-
lenging Community action in a particular field.56 The principle is im-
portant in this context because it permits the best interests of the
52. See Case 302/86, Commission v. Kingdom of Denmark, [1988] E.C.R. 4607 (Danish
bottles case); Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral A.G. v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung, [1979] E.C.R
649.
53. EC TRAi'y art. 3B.
54. SeeA.G. Toth, A Legal Analysis ofSubsidiaity, Josephine Steiner, Subsidiarity Under the
Maastricht Treaty, Nicholas Emiliou, Subsidiarity: Panacea orFigLeaf?, in LEGAL ISSUES OF THE
MAASTmICHT TRAT, supra note 29, at 37, 49, 65; Deborah Z. Cass, The Word that Saves
Maastncht? The Principle of Subsidiariy and the Division of Powers Within the European Commu-
nity, 29 COMMON MKr. L. REv. 1107 (1992); A.G. Toth, The Principle of Subsidiarity in the
Maastricht Tmaty, 29 COMMON Micr. L. R'v. 1079 (1992).
55. See Commission Report to the European Council on the Adaptation of Community
Legislation to the Subsidiarity Principle, COM(93)545 final. Subsidiarity was also one of
the key areas of discussion of the European Council in its Edinburgh Summit meeting in
December 1992. EUROPEAN COUNCIL IN EDINBURGH, CONCLUSIONS OF THE PRESIDENCY, Bull.
EC 12-1992 (annex to part A., at 11-12).
56. Emiliou, supra note 54, at 77-81.
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environment to be considered in determining the appropriate level of
action and the division of powers between the Community and the
member states. Unfortunately, it provides only limited guidance as to
how these questions are to be resolved.
Yet another restraint on Community competence to regulate the
environment is the explicit recognition that member states are com-
petent to negotiate in international bodies and conclude interna-
tional agreements. Article 130R(4) provides that "within their
respective spheres of competence, the Community and the Member
States shall co-operate with third countries and with the competent
international organisations."57 Again the extent of this restraint is un-
clear because there is no express delimitation of these respective
spheres in the Treaty.
The U.S. government, in contrast, is not subject to the same re-
strictions on its legislative capacity. Although the Constitution does
not provide express competence to legislate for the protection of the
environment, it does grant Congress various law-making powers,
which have been expansively interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court to create a wide federal competence in the environ-
mental sphere. This broad competence is rooted primarily in the
Commerce Clause, which grants Congress the power to regulate com-
merce with foreign nations and among the several states.58 As one
commentator has remarked, "any theoretical limit on the potential
range of federal power has been rendered virtually completely aca-
demic in the environmental sphere by the sweeping construction of
federal power under the interstate commerce clause."59 A parallel
can be profitably drawn here with the initial legal basis for E.U. envi-
ronmental policy, namely the authority necessary to ensure the
proper functioning of the common market. The U.S. power is more
extensive, however, as it has been interpreted to authorise Congress to
regulate any commercial or industrial activity which has a "substantial
economic affect on interstate commerce."60
There is no parallel in the E.U. to the other competencies of the
U.S. government in the field of environmental law. Congress has the
power to make regulations concerning federal lands.6" The E.U. as an
57. EC TRFAT art. 130R(4).
58. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
59. Manus, supra note 35, at 378.
60. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (upholding Congress's power to regu-
late home grown and home consumed wheat on the theory that the activity has a cumula-
tive affect on interstate prices).
61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
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entity is not an owner of land. Congress has the power to levy taxes
and spend the proceeds.6" The power of taxation is jealously guarded
by the member states of the E.U. In the U.S., the President has the
authority to enter into treaties63 and Congress has the power to pass
implementing legislation.64 As has already been discussed above, the
E.U. has only limited competency in this area. In summary, with re-
gard to the legislative competence of the U.S. in environmental mat-
ters, it is hard to disagree with the conclusion that "Congress as a
practical matter has virtually unlimited authority to enact measures
regulating, taxing, or subsidising the use and development of environ-
mental and natural resources within the United States." 65 Finally,
there is no parallel to the "takings clause" in the Fifth Amendment66
which can inhibit both state and federal environmental regulation if
the measure diminishes the value of private property and the property
owner must be compensated for lost value.67
IV. LEGISLATIVE INSTRUMENTS
Having considered the legislative competency of the E.U. and the
U.S., this Article now considers the legislative instruments in both sys-
tems. Arriving at binding environmental legislation in the E.U. is a
two tiered process. The first legislative instrument of environmental
policy is the action programme which identifies broad policy objec-
tives. To date, five environmental action programmes have been im-
plemented, with each covering a period between four and five years.
The most recent covers the period from 1992 to 1997. These highly
general, non-binding action programmes are typically adopted
through a council resolution by which the member states agree to im-
plement the measures described. The objective of these programmes
is to set out, in the broadest terms, the future direction of Community
environmental policy.
Following the adoption of an action programme, the Community
then has a choice of legislative instruments to implement the policy.
Article 189 of the EC Treaty provides for three types of binding legisla-
62. Id. cl. 1.
63. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
64. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
65. REHBINDER & STEWART, supra note 3, at 44.
66. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation").
67. There is a possibility, however, that compensation for interference with rights to
property could be inferred through invoking Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the European Con-
vention on Human Rights. See Case 44/79, Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, [1979] E.C.R.
3727.
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five instruments: the regulation, the directive, and the decision.6"
Regulations and directives have been used to implement environmen-
tal policy. A regulation is a more binding form of legislative instru-
ment than a directive, as it is "binding in its entirety and directly
applicable in all member states."69 A directive, on the other hand, is
binding only as to the result to be achieved, with the choice of meth-
ods left to each member state. Furthermore, it is binding only on
member states as opposed to private actors.
For a number of reasons, the primary method of implementing
environmental policy has been by way of directives, although regula-
tions have also been used occasionally.7 ° Because of their flexibility,
directives are particularly well suited to the implementation of envi-
ronmental policy. They also have the advantage of providing a degree
of discretion in implementation to member states which may be criti-
cal to achieving agreement to the directives. For example, Article 3 of
the Council Directive on the Freedom of Access to Information on the
Environment 7' requires member states to ensure that public authori-
ties make information relating to the environment available to any
natural or legal person.72 The exact arrangements for making this
information available are not specified by the Directive. Instead, Arti-
cle 3 provides that "Member States shall define the practical arrange-
68. In addition to regulations and directives, there are informal methods of action
such as recommendations and opinions, which are used to make policy declarations, initi-
ate research programmes, or set up special funds. See EC TREATr art. 189.
69. Article 189 of the Treaty provides:
In order to carry out their task and in accordance with the provisions of this
treaty, the European Parliament acting jointly with the Council, the Council and
the Commission shall make regulations and issue directives, make decisions,
make recommendations or deliver opinions.
A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety
and directly applicable in all Member States.
A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Mem-
ber State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the
choice of form and methods.
A decision shall be binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is addressed.
Recommendations and opinions shall have no binding force.
Id.
70. Regulations have been promulgated to implement obligations stemming from in-
ternational agreements. See, e.g., Council Regulation 348/81 on Common Rules for Im-
ports of Whales and other Cetacean Products, 1981 O.J. (L 39) 1; Council Regulation
3626/82 on the Implementation in the Community of the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 1982 O.J. (L 384) 1; see also
CHARLESWORTH & CULLEN, supra note 29, at 444.
71. Council Directive 90/313 on the Freedom of Access to Information on the Envi-
ronment, art. 3, 1990 O.J. (L 158) 56, 57.
72. Id.
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ments under which such information is effectively made available."7"
Flexibility of this sort introduces the possibility that environmental
policy will not be uniform across the member states of the E.U. Signif-
icant departures may be made from measures as originally designed
because of national legislation which does not faithfully implement
the Community directives, or because of differing legal and adminis-
trative structures. The increasing numbers of directives and the in-
creasing workload of Community institutions has resulted in relatively
lax monitoring of enforcement, leading to further variation in the im-
plementation of Community directives in the member states. Thus,
federal power to regulate the environment is weakened because of the
requirement to transpose measures into national legislation.74
These problems are diminished to some degree by the increasing
specificity of directives. As envisaged by Article 189(3) of the EC
Treaty, directives are not meant to be instruments of uniformity, but
rather they should set out frameworks, objectives, and goals, leaving
the method of achieving the intended objectives to the member
states.75 As the Community's legal system evolves, it appears that di-
rectives are increasingly drafted with great particularity, leaving little
discretion to the member states. Rehbinder and Stewart have identi-
fied three types of directives with varying degrees of specificity and
legal effect on member states: first, typical directives that closely fol-
low the model set forth in Article 189 of the EEC Treaty; second, regu-
lation-type directives, which contain detailed substantive provisions;
and third, framework directives, which set out broad objectives and
basic principles, later amplified with a number of more specific direc-
tives. 76 Thus, the system has evolved towards favoring greater use of
specific directives as an instrument of achieving uniformity, creating a
corresponding increase in centralized powers.
Another significant difference between the legislative competen-
cies of the two systems is that, in the E.U., unlike the U.S., environ-
mental legislation typically is not directly binding on individuals. As
previously noted, the main instrument of environmental policy in the
E.U. is the directive. Article 189(3) of the EC Treaty provides that a
directive is binding only upon member states, which are then required
to implement that directive in their national laws. Thus, Community
law is enforced directly against the member states, with the individual
73. Id.
74. The specific difficulties of implementation and enforcement are discussed in Part
IV, infra.
75. EC TR.ATy art. 189.
76. REHBINDER & STEWART, supra note 3, at 35.
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having little or no role to play. However, the doctrine of direct effect
of directives has modified this scheme to bring the E.U. system closer
to that of the U.S. The doctrine of direct effect, as it has evolved
through the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, provides
that if a directive is unconditional and sufficiently precise, and if the
time limitation for its implementation by a member state has expired,
then an individual can rely directly on a directive in an action against
a public body before the court of a member state. 7 7 Under this doc-
trine, individuals can invoke Community law before their national
courts, even if Community law is in conflict with national law. In addi-
tion, the European Court established in Francovich and Others v. Italy78
that an individual, in certain circumstances, is entitled to damages
against a state for non-implementation of a directive.79 These devel-
opments considerably extend the reach of directives that satisfy the
necessary criteria, and as a result, central institutions are further
strengthened.
In contrast, the U.S. government enjoys a much more extensive
range of legislative strategies by which it can regulate the environment
in all fifty states. For purposes of comparison, these strategies can be
divided into four categories: federal standards with federal imple-
mentation and enforcement; federal standards with state implementa-
tion and enforcement; federal management of federally owned lands
and resources; and federal requirements or incentives for state adop-
tion and enforcement of environmental protection measures.8 0 The
incentives in the latter category include innovative strategies such as
marketable permit systems and the distribution of clean-up grants.
As discussed previously, there is no E.U. equivalent to the U.S.
federal capacity to manage public resources. The amount of land di-
rectly owned by the E.U., and therefore subject to its direct manage-
ment, is negligible. Similarly, there is no equivalent in the E.U. to
77. The doctrine of direct effect is discussed in Pierre Pescatore, The Doctrine of "Direct
Effect": An Infant Disease of Community Law, 8 EuR. L. REV. 155 (1983). The doctrine has
been applied by the Court ofJustice of the European Communities in Case 8/81, Becker v.
Finanzamt Mfinster-Innenstadt, [1982] E.C.R. 53; Case 148/78, Pubblico Minestero V. Tul-
lio Ratti, [1979] E.C.R. 1629; Case 41/74, van Duyn v. Home Office, [1974] E.C.R. 1337.
78. Joined Cases C-6/90, C-9/90, [1991] E.C.R. 1-5357.
79. The Court identified three criteria to be satisfied in order to collect damages: First,
the result established by the directive must involve the attribution of rights to individuals;
secondly, the content of those rights must be capable of being identified from the provi-
sion of the directive; and thirdly, there must be a causal link between the failure by the
member state to fulfil its obligations and the damage suffered by individuals. See BAtu-
moNTr & WEATHERIU, supra note 9, at 303.
80. The four basic strategies of U.S. federal legislation are identified in REHBINDER &
STEWART, supra note 3, at 46-55.
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federal standards which are federally implemented and enforced.
The political structure of the E.U. is such that member states retain
sovereignty, and therefore, the Community has no power directly to
implement and enforce its legislation in the member states. The
power of the central institutions in the U.S. and the E.U. is co-exten-
sive only with the second and fourth strategies, namely federal stan-
dards with state implementation and enforcement and federal
requirements or incentives for state adoption and enforcement of en-
vironmental provisions. E.U. directives correspond to both of these
categories. Some directives establish extremely specific Community
standards which must be adopted by member states,"1 while others
require the adoption of provisions to protect the environment."2
A comparison of direct legislative powers demonstrates that the
U.S. government possesses much more extensive regulatory power
than do the federal institutions of the E.U. Particularly important
from the point of view of balance of power is the capacity of the U.S.
government directly to implement and enforce standards regulating
private conduct in the individual states, a power presently unthinkable
in the E.U. Additionally, as discussed below, the U.S. government has
much more extensive powers of enforcement.
V. METHODS OF IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT
The de facto power of central institutions can be seen clearly in
their capacity to enforce legislative measures. The weak enforcement
powers of EC institutions is a serious deficiency in European Commu-
nity law. E.U. enforcement methods are extremely limited when com-
pared to those available in the U.S., and the considerable reluctance
of many member states to implement E.U. policy causes significant
problems. This section will consider the powers of central institutions
to ensure that central legislation is enforced."
81. See, e.g., Council Directive 75/440 Concerning the Quality Required of Surface
Water Intended for the Abstraction of Drinking Water in the Member States, 1975 OJ. (L
194) 26.
82. See, e.g., Council Directive on Hazardous Waste, 1991 O.J. (L 377) 20. This direc-
tive requires member states, among other things, to "take the necessary measures to ensure
that, in the course of collection, transport and temporary storage, waste is properly pack-
aged and labelled in accordance with the international and Community standards in
force." Id. art. 5. Furthermore, it requires "competent authorities [to] draw up... plans
for the management of hazardous waste and [to] make these plans public." Id. art. 6.
83. For a consideration of the problems of implementation and enforcement in the
E.U., see KRAMER, supra note 51, chs. 5, 6; Tamara R. Crockett & Cynthia B. Schultz, The
Integration of Environmental Policy and the European Community, Recent Problems of Implementa-
tion and Enforcement, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 170 (1991); Richard Macrory, The Enforce-
ment of Community Environmental Laws: Some Critical Issues, 29 COMMON MKT. L. Rzv. 347
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There is at present a considerable body of Community environ-
mental legislation, most of which is in the form of directives. As dis-
cussed above, these directives are not directly binding on member
states but must be transposed into national law.84 Thus we speak of
the requirement that directives be both implemented and enforced.
Implementation is the process by which a member state's legal obliga-
tions under Community law are fulfilled either by the enactment of
national law or the adoption of policies and practices which satisfy the
legal obligations. Enforcement is the process by which the Commu-
nity ensures implementation takes place.85
Failure of implementation can be divided into three categories
based on the member state's obligations: first, failure by a member
state to communicate to the Commission the national laws and meas-
ures that it has taken to implement a particular community mea-
sure;86 second, incomplete or incorrect transposition of Community
obligations into national law; and third, failure of practical compli-
ance by member states with the requirements of the directives.87 The
Commission has the role of ensuring that there is effective application
of Community law in the member states.88
The enforcement of Community law by the Commission is a
three-stage process governed by Article 169 of the EC Treaty.89 If the
Commission learns that a member state has not fulfilled one of its
obligations under the Treaty, it first sends a formal letter to the mem-
ber state informing it of the breach of its obligation. The Commission
then sends a reasoned opinion to the member state concerned.90 Fi-
(1992); Mogens Moe, Implementation and Enforcement in a Federal System, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q.
151 (1993).
84. See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
85. This distinction between implementation and enforcement is made by Macrory,
supra note 83, at 348.
86. Directives usually specify a date by which a member state must enact measures to
comply with a directive and require that the Commission be notified of a member state's
implementing measures. For example, Council Directive 90/313 on the Freedom of Ac-
cess to Information on the Environment provides in Article 9: "Member States shall bring
into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this
Directive by 31 December 1992 at the latest. They shall forthwith inform the Commission
thereof." Council Directive 90/313, art. 9, 1990 O.J. (L 158) 56, 58.
87. Macrory, supra note 83, at 352.
88. Article 155 of the EEC Treaty assigns this role to the Commission providing that
"[iln order to ensure the proper functioning and development of the common market,
the Commission shall: ensure that the provision of this Treaty and the measures taken by
the institutions thereto are applied." EC TRArvy art. 155.
89. Id. art. 169.
90. Informal agreement is often reached with Member States at the first two stages or
perhaps earlier following an informal intimation that the Commission is investigating the
non-implementation of a particular measure. Macrory, supra note 83, at 352.
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nally, if no settlement has been reached and noncompliance contin-
ues, the matter is referred to the European Court which may find
against the non-complying state.
It is important to note at this point, however, that the judgment
of the European Court of Justice is in essence only a declaratory judg-
ment. The Court has no power to impose sanctions on member states
for failure to comply with Community law, nor can it strike down na-
tional legislation found to be incompatible with Community law.9 ' If
a member state fails to comply with a decision of the Court, it can be
sued for a breach of Article 171.92 However, prior to this second ac-
tion, the Commission must send a reasoned opinion specifying the
manner in which the member state has not complied with the judg-
ment of the Court of Justice.9 s If the Court finds against the member
state a second time, a pecuniary sanction may be imposed.94 Unfortu-
nately, this is a long and complex procedure, unsuited to environmen-
tal matters, because the damage to the environment may be
irreparable by the time the process is completed.95
Apart from litigation by the Commission against member states,
the Community has no other legal powers by which it can enforce
environmental directives. Direct litigation to compel firms or private
persons to comply with environmental directives is not available under
Community law. The enforcement of directives which are incorpo-
rated into national law is the exclusive responsibility of the member
states.96 Moreover, Community law fails to provide citizens with a
meaningful role in the enforcement of environmental legislation.
The European Court has no jurisdiction to hear citizen suits concern-
ing the incorporation, implementation, or enforcement of direc-
tives.9 Furthermore, there is no authority for citizen enforcement
actions against private bodies under Community law. 98
Those familiar with U.S. environmental law can readily see that
the E.U. lacks the extensive and well-defined methods of enforcement
one would expect to see in a developed federation. Crucial differ-
91. See KRAMER, supra note 51, at 155 (observing that it is well known that a number of
member states quite openly do not respect community legislation and disregard directives
for years without being sanctioned).
92. EC TREATY art. 171.
93. Id. art. 171(2).
94. Article 171 of the EC Treaty requires a member state "to take the necessary meas-
ures to comply with the judgment of the Court ofJustice." EC TREATY art. 171.
95. KRAMER, supra note 51, at 154.
96. REHBINDER & STEWART, supra note 3, at 145.
97. Id. at 159.
98. Id. at 164.
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ences between the current systems in the U.S. and the E.U. illustrate
the severe weakness of the environmental enforcement system avail-
able to the central institutions of the E.U. In contrast to the E.U.,
where litigation by central authorities against private firms or persons
is unavailable, the U.S. government possesses extensive powers to sue
private individuals in environmental enforcement actions. For exam-
ple, the Clean Water Act contains provisions which authorise civil en-
forcement actions for injunctive relief and criminal penalties for
negligent violations of the statute. 9 Individual states may elect to im-
plement federal legislation setting standards and authorising regula-
tion, while the federal government may retain the power to enforce
implementing measures directly against private violators. Addition-
ally, the U.S. government may revoke the delegation of enforcement
powers to states and take over enforcement responsibility itself.10
Such powers would be unthinkable in the E.U. as they are incompati-
ble with the sovereignty of the member states.
The much greater role played by private citizens in monitoring of
the implementation and enforcement of federal legislation is another
notable feature of the U.S. system. U.S. citizens can take actions
which, in similar situations, are entirely unavailable to citizens of the
member states of the E.U. For example, in the U.S., an aggrieved
citizen can obtain judicial review of an agency's promulgation of a
regulation implementing federal legislation by alleging that the regu-
lation is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law. 10' Congress has also written into many envi-
ronmental statutes a judicial review provision which gives citizens the
right to bring suit for an agency's failure to perform any nondiscre-
tionary duty. The Clean Water Act section 505 citizen suit provision
was the prototype in this area.'0 Additionally, many other U.S. stat-
utes contain provisions allowing citizens to sue directly for violations
of federal regulatory requirements. In contrast, no provision is made
for citizen enforcement of directives or citizen participation in admin-
istrative proceedings before the Court of Justice. Moreover, judicial
99. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 309(b), (c), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b), (c) (1988
& Supp. V 1993) [hereinafter Clean Water Act].
100. REHBINDER & STEWART, supra note 3, at 191.
101. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706 (1988).
102. Clean Water Act § 505(a), (d), 33 U.S.C. § 1265(a), (d), authorises citizen suits for
injunctive relief and civil penalties against any person violating an effluent standard or
consent order, and provides for awards of attorneys' fees to prevailing parties. See ROBERT
W. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY 987-88 (1992).
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review is extremely limited by restrictive rules of standing and rules
limiting the scope of review.10 3 -
A comparison of the jurisdiction of the U.S. and the E.U. courts
in environmental matters is also revealing. As with the legislative com-
petencies of the two entities, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of
the United States is much more extensive than that of the European
Court ofJustice. The European Court has jurisdiction over matters of
the interpretation and application of Community law, and its deci-
sions must be followed by national courts, however, it has nojurisdic-
tion to consider the national laws of the member states, except where
they are in conflict with EC law. The jurisdiction of the United States
Supreme Court is not similarly limited, however. Article III of the
Constitution grants the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over con-
troversies between states.1" 4 Additionally, federal courts have jurisdic-
tion over controversies arising under the laws of the United States.1 5
These powers have been interpreted broadly to settle disputes over
interstate pollution and resource disputes. °6 Federal courts are also
given jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime cases.10 7
In the U.S., federal courts have jurisdiction to review federal
agency action or inaction related to the exercise of the agency's dele-
gated authority under federal law.' Federal courts can hear civil and
criminal enforcement actions initiated by (1) the government, (2) citi-
zen enforcement suits against industry and developers for violations of
federal regulatory requirements, and (3) disputes among states con-
cerning transboundary pollution actions. 0 9 The jurisdiction of the
European Court of Justice seems minor in comparison. As discussed
above, it is restricted to considering matters concerning the interpre-
tation of Community law, and whether member states have complied
with their obligations under Community law." 0 In the U.S. this would
103. These rules vary from member state to member state, resulting in no uniformity in
remedies, court powers, and rules of standing. Uniform control over implementation and
enforcement of environmental directives, therefore, is extremely difficult. See REHBINDER
& STEWART, supra note 3, at 149-58 (discussing the limitations of privately initiated adminis-
trative and judicial review of member state implementation).
104. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
106. REHBINDER & STEWART, supra note 3, at 44.
107. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
108. 5 U.S.C. § 703.
109. REHBINDER & STEWART, supra note 3, at 188-91.
110. Article 164 of the EC Treaty provides that the Court's task is to "ensure that in the
interpretation and application of this treaty the law is observed." EC TREATv art. 164; see
also id. art. 169 (setting forth the authority of the Commission to bring before the Court of
Justice a member state alleged to be failing to fulfil its treaty obligations); CHARLESWORTH
& CULLEN, supra note 25, at 28-32 (discussing the Court of Justice).
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be comparable to restricting the jurisdiction of federal courts to the
interpretation of the Constitution and deciding whether a state had
violated the Constitution. It is clear that such a restriction would con-
siderably hamper the ability of the U.S. government to enforce envi-
ronmental legislation.
The lack of sufficient tools to implement and enforce environ-
mental legislation in the E.U. is a significant structural weakness. It is
clear that the present system is failing in many respects."1 Indeed,
the measures available to the Commission to enforce environmental
measures is weak even in Community terms. Sophisticated control
mechanisms and inspection bodies have been established in the areas
of competition,1 12 fishery,' 13 veterinary questions and customs and re-
gional policy.' 14 This has not yet been done for environmental meas-
ures. Additionally, there are particular features of the Community's
environmental programme which cause difficulties in implementa-
tion. Ludwig Kramer has identified one of the key weaknesses of
Community environmental law: its lack of readily identifiable parties
with vested interests who are willing and able to secure enforcement.
Environmental organisations in Western Europe are structurally too
weak to defend environmental interests effectively over a long period
of time and, as we have seen, neither Community nor member state
law provides sufficient legal authority for private individuals or groups
to enforce environmental legislation." 5 In this respect, the E.U. has
much to learn from U.S. experience with citizen suits.
The relative newness of the Community's environmental policy is
also a factor contributing to enforcement difficulties. The Director-
ate-General responsible for environmental matters has a small and in-
experienced staff when compared with the longer established
Directorates relating to agriculture and competition policy. Another
factor further complicating matters is the use of the relatively impre-
111. For an illustration of the extent of member state compliance with environmental
measures, see REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF DIRECTIVE 85/
337/EEC ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTS OF CERTAIN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PROJECTS ON
THE ENVIRONMENT, EUR. PARL. Doc. (Coin (93) 28) (vols. 12 & 13). This report concluded
that "there has been a serious overrun on the timetable for formal compliance by the
approved date" and as far as application in practice is concerned, "in a number of Member
States, only a minority of environmental impact assessments are of satisfactory quality." Id.
at 5.4, 5.5.
112. See Reg. 17 of Feb. 6, 1962:1962 .J. point 13.
113. See Council Regulation 2847/93 Establishing a Control System Applicable to the
Common Fisheries Policy, 1993 O.J. (L 261) 1.
114. This point has been repeatedly emphasised by Ludwig Kramer, former head of
Directorate-General XI. See KRAMER, supra note 51, at 132-33.
115. Id. at 132; see also Macrory, supra note 83, at 350.
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cise directive as the primary means of implementing E.U. policy.
When many directives were first agreed to by member states, it is fair
to say that based on the large amount of discretion given to member
states, the directives may have been viewed in a different light. The
developing jurisprudence of the Court of Justice has led to a transfor-
mation of directives as legal instruments which are now viewed as giv-
ing rise to more extensive and more directly binding legal
commitments.11 6 As one commentator points out: "[O]ne can only
speculate whether Member States would have readily agreed [to] the
terms of some [o]f the earlier environmental directives had they ap-
preciated their full legal significance, or had the development in the
European Court's jurisprudence occurred at an earlier date."117 It is
likely that the reluctance of member states to implement much envi-
ronmental legislation may stem from the ambiguous nature of their
commitment to the measures. Finding a remedy for these weaknesses
in implementation and enforcement has been identified by the Com-
mission as a key area for action. To this end, a European Environ-
mental Agency has been created, which will gather data and analyse
the extent of compliance with Community environmental legisla-
tion."' However, to those familiar with the extensive powers of the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the European Agency
is a very poor cousin. It lacks powers of investigation, enforcement,
and even policy formulation. Its scope of reference is clearly re-
stricted to information gathering and assessment.1 9 Efforts by the
European Parliament to provide the Agency with a more explicit en-
forcement and inspection authority were resisted. The regulation es-
tablishing the Agency provides that after two years the Agency's
position will be reviewed to determine the extent to which the Agency
can participate with the Commission and member states in monitor-
116. See KRAMER, supra note 51, at 154. It has been achieved by the development of the
doctrines of direct effect, discussed above, and the doctrine of sympathetic interpretation
which requires that national law be given an interpretation which is sympathetic to, and
compatible with, Community law. See Case 14/83, von Colson and Kamann v. Land
Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] E.C.R. 1891; see also supra note 52 and cases cited therein.
117. Macrory, supra note 83, at 351.
118. Council Regulation 1210/90 on the establishment of the European Environment
Agency and the European Environment Information and Observation Network, 1990 OJ.
(L 120) 1.
119. Article 1 of the Regulation provides that
the objective shall be to provide the Community and the Member States with:
-objective, reliable and comparable information at European level enabling
them to take the requisite measures to protect the environment, to assess the
results of such measures and to ensure that the public is properly informed
about the state of the environment.
Id. art. 1, at 2.
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ing compliance with Community environmental standards."' Since
the regulation only entered into effect at the end of 1993, this provi-
sion is not effective as of this writing. It remains to be seen, therefore,
whether the Agency will have even a discernible impact on the en-
forcement of Community environmental law.
Another innovation that is directed towards the improved en-
forcement of environmental legislation is an implementation net-
work. The network is charged with the dual tasks of exchanging
experiences and information among member states and of developing
practical approaches to implementation under the supervision of the
Commission. The implementation network was announced in the
Fifth Environmental Action Programme, but is not yet fully
operative. 12 1
In light of the foregoing, the irresistible conclusion is that, in
terms of enforcement and implementation of its environmental regu-
lation, the central institutions of the E.U. are only in their infancy.
This becomes particularly clear when the E.U. approach is compared
with the enforcement regime of the U.S. which has strong teeth, and
is supported by a strong and effective system of federal courts. While
this might lead one to conclude that the E.U. should learn from the
experience and adopt many U.S. enforcement tools, the political real-
ity is that member states are unlikely to agree to more direct enforce-
ment of central environmental measures by a central institution (as
this would result in a diminution of their sovereignty). It is also un-
likely that this situation will change in the near future.
CONCLUSION-SPECIFIC PROBLEMS OF ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM IN
THE E.U. AND THE U.S.
The foregoing comparison of the structure of the environmental
regimes of the E.U. and the U.S. makes it clear that there are pres-
ently many similarities between environmental federalism in the U.S.
and the E.U. However, there are at least as many significant differ-
ences which create problems of environmental federalism peculiar to
each system.
The similarities between the two systems have been discussed
above, and are readily apparent. The central institutions of the E.U.
and the U.S. both attempt to regulate an environment which varies
significantly across the territory being regulated, making any attempt
120. Id. art. 20, at 5.
121. Council Resolution 93/C on a Community Programme of Policy and Action in
Relation to the Environment and Sustainable Development, 1993 OJ. (C 138) 1.
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to set a rigid central policy undesirable and impossible. Both the E.U.
and the U.S. systems comprise a central authority and strong regional
entities which are resistant to central regulation of the environment.
In the formulation of policy and the enactment of central legislation
both entities are subject to similar environmental, economic, and
political advantages and disadvantages of central regulation of the en-
vironment. However, the strength and weakness of these factors vary
greatly in each system. Moreover, effectuation of central policy in
both entities must rely to a greater or lesser extent on state authorities
to conduct enforcement and implementation functions.
The differences between the E.U. and the U.S. are equally obvi-
ous. Federal institutions in the U.S. are more developed, powerful,
and confident than their E.U. counterparts. This is true in all
branches of the central government. The U.S. government owns up
to a third of the land in the country, giving it considerable direct regu-
latory power. Additionally, the legislative competence of Congress to
legislate on environmental matters is far more extensive than in the
E.U. Complimenting these strengths in the U.S. is a court system
which has a wider jurisdiction and a more extensive range of sanctions
and remedies than that in the E.U. Furthermore, the U.S. court sys-
tem possesses particular significant capacities which are not present in
the E.U., such as citizen suits and the authority to review agency dis-
cretion. The more developed court system in the U.S. has led to the
development of environmental law through the courts, a situation
which does not obtain in the E.U.
Another major difference between these systems is the relative
strengths of the centre and the regions. In the E.U. it is the member
states which are more powerful, in the U.S. the relationship is re-
versed. Member states in the E.U. must, by and large, directly agree to
the adoption of environmental policies and measures, while in the
U.S. states have no direct voice other than through their elected fed-
eral representatives. In the E.U., reaching consensus with member
states that are less developed, and for which the protection of the en-
vironment is not a primary objective, thus becomes a primary con-
cern, and a significant difficulty.
In addition to these similarities and dissimilarities, there are a
number of impediments to environmental regulation which while
present in the U.S., are particularly acute in the E.U. The first and
most significant must certainly be the resentment of centralised direc-
tion and control by local political entities. The E.C. is composed of
sovereign and independent nation-states, some of which are particu-
larly adamant to maintain their sovereignty and independence. The
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resentment of strong central power is apparent in all areas of policy,
not only in the environmental arena. This resentment leads to a sense
of skepticism about the continuing integration of the E.U., and about
even its continued existence as presently constituted. In Britain and
Denmark, for example, there still remains a sizeable political drive to
withdraw from the E.U. While this movement is unlikely to be success-
ful, it is clear that varying levels of commitment to the idea of the E.U.
are not conducive to the acceptance of increased central powers to
regulate the environment.
Second, differences between legal and administrative systems
within each entity are more acute in the E.U. The legal systems in the
E.U. have evolved separately over thousands of years, and although
they divide into only two main types-common-law systems and civil-
law systems-there are divisions in tradition within these types which
result in significant differences in fundamental concepts, theories of
interpretation, approaches to case law, views of justice, and the place
of law in society. There are, in addition, differences in the political
structure among the member states. Some countries, such as Ireland
and Great Britain, are highly centralised, while others, such as Spain
and Germany, are composed of regions which retain great power.
These differences between the E.U. and the U.S. have conse-
quences for the types of environmental regulation one finds in both
systems. The more developed central government in the U.S., with its
wider legislative competencies, facilitates the development of more
comprehensive and more structured federal environmental regula-
tion when compared with that of the E.U. The major causes of envi-
ronmental damage are regulated at the federal level in the U.S.
through such legislation as the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act,
the Endangered Species Act, the Oil Pollution Act, and the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act.
The difficulty of securing agreement to environmental issues by often
reluctant member states which are largely self-interested has meant
that E.U. environmental legislation is by no means as comprehensive
as that in the U.S. Difficulties in consensus-building also has meant
that major environmental problems, such as the protection of the
marine environment, are not regulated. E.U. environmental legisla-
tion has developed in a reactionary fashion rather than in a proactive
and integrated manner.
The U.S. government also has a much wider range of legislative
measures open to it than does the E.U. because of its greater legisla-
tive competencies. More innovative solutions to environmental
problems can therefore be sought in the U.S. An example is the abil-
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ity to use the power of taxation to establish economic and fiscal meas-
ures to achieve environmental protection. E.U. consideration of the
adoption of a tax on carbon or energy must overcome the obstacle of
the unanimity requirement for member states for enactment. 122 The
E.U. must also contend with the reluctance of member states to sur-
render their powers of taxation.
Having compared the most significant characteristics of both sys-
tems, a number of conclusions can be drawn. First, it is clear that the
federal government in the U.S. has greater powers to issue and en-
force environmental law than the central institutions of the E.U. This
is evidenced by the more comprehensive and coherent body of envi-
ronmental law in the U.S., and in the existence of central agencies,
such as EPA, which have strong enforcement powers. Second, the fed-
eral structure of both systems has led to a division of competencies
between the centre and the regions. In the U.S. this division has
evolved so that policies, objectives, and standards are outlined and
defined centrally, and implementation and enforcement typically oc-
cur at the state level. In the E.U., policies, objectives, and some stan-
dards are defined centrally, and some are implemented and enforced
by member states, but these must co-exist beside the policies, objec-
tives, and standards established in each individual member state.
Third, in both systems, the political and economic tensions between
governmental bodies at the central and regional levels have meant
that protection of the environment has not been optimal; opposition
to central regulation makes it difficult to enact central measures at all
or of sufficient stringency to protect the environment adequately.
Furthermore, implementation and enforcement of existing measures
has been inadequate in both systems. In the U.S., time consuming
and expensive litigation has been required to determine state and fed-
eral roles in undertaking actions to protect the environment. It is rea-
sonable to expect similar litigation in the E.U. in the future. Fourth,
not only has neither entity solved the difficulties of protecting the en-
vironment in a federal system, neither system has even adequately ad-
dressed the issues involved. This is perhaps unsurprising given the
relatively recent evolution of environmental law as a discrete disci-
pline in both the U.S. and the E.U.
The discussion below presents some points for consideration in
solving the problems of environmental federalism. This part will draw
on the discussions of the advantages of central regulation in Part I of
this Article, and the existing evolution of both systems.
122. EC TRFATVy art. 130S(2).
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The first suggestion is that, at a minimum, the overall policies
and objectives for the environment ought to be defined centrally.
This suggestion is made for a number of reasons. Centrally estab-
lished objectives and policies have the potential to encourage more
stringent environmental protection in regions for which the protec-
tion of the environment may not be the highest priority. Additionally,
in both the U.S. and E.U., the elimination of barriers to trade and the
facilitation of free competition between regions is an important objec-
tive. A certain amount of central regulation is necessary to achieve
these goals. Also, if the entities are to obtain the maximum advantage
for themselves in international negotiations, it will be necessary to
present a common front, and therefore it will be necessary to decide
on common policies and objectives in discrete sectors. The approach
of the E.U. and the U.S. in defining policies and objectives at the cen-
tre-the E.U. through successive action programmes on the environ-
ment and the U.S. through, inter alia, comprehensive federal statutes,
provides empirical support for this contention. This is not to say, how-
ever, that regions cannot outline additional objectives or adopt addi-
tional policies to those set centrally. Additional and more stringent
measures can be of benefit to the environment and may not constitute
barriers to trade. Nor is it argued that the centre should adopt such
policies without consultation with the regions. Clearly, a cooperative
approach is to be favoured, given the existence of regional hostilities
to central regulation.
Beyond the adoption of uniform, minimum policies and objec-
tives for all sectors of the environment at the centre, I would further
contend that, in certain sectors, standards ought to be set centrally, at
varying degrees of specificity. Environmental issues with trans-
boundary implications, such as pollution of rivers or sea areas, air-
borne pollution, conservation of migratory species, protection of the
outer atmosphere, and so on, clearly cannot be addressed on a region-
by-region basis. A minimum harmonisation of product standards is
also necessary to prevent the creation of unnecessary barriers to trade.
It is then possible to identify areas which ought to be regulated by
the regions. These are sectors where the standards to be set or the
approach to be adopted is locality specific and dependant on the
physical and geographical characteristics of the region or its state of
industrial and economic development. Town and country land use
planning falls most clearly within this designation, but it is also possi-
ble to include matters such as the identification of habitats to be pro-
tected, or the protection of biodiversity in a region, or the clean up of
contaminated lands. Implementation and enforcement of central
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regulation is also best done by the regions, simply because of the dis-
economies of scale which arise and the inefficiencies which are pres-
ent in any central bureaucracy large enough to enforce central
regulation in such large entities as the E.U. and the U.S.
There is a grey middle ground between what is best regulated by
the regions and what is best regulated by the centre. In this area, it is
more difficult to arrive at a principled approach to the relative roles of
the centre and the regions. Nevertheless, I would argue that a cooper-
ative approach should be adopted, with central adoption of at least
outline minimum standards or levels of protection at varying levels of
specificity, allowing regions either to implement these standards, or to
adopt more stringent measures consistent with the objectives of pre-
serving freedom of trade and competition. The regulation of environ-
mental impact assessments can serve as an example of this cooperative
approach. The objectives, parameters, and standards involved in envi-
ronmental assessments can be defined centrally, but the actual impact
assessments should be carried out locally by those with a knowledge of
the locality or region. In fact, this is the approach currently taken by
both the U.S. and the E.U. This cooperative approach is suggested for
two reasons. First, it allows environmental regulation to benefit from
the harmonising effect of uniform, minimum standards, while al-
lowing sufficient flexibility to the regions to counter hostility to cen-
tral direction. Second, an analogy may be drawn here with human
rights. It is arguable that certain minimum standards of environmen-
tal protection ought to be achieved by all countries and regions, par-
ticularly if one accepts that the environment is the common heritage
of us all.
In conclusion, this Article has sought to compare various aspects
of environmental federalism in the U.S. and the E.U. Both systems
have been criticised for failing to address adequately the problems
created by their constitutional structures for the protection of the en-
vironment. Some points for consideration have been offered as solu-
tions to how these problems might be resolved. It is hoped that the
U.S. and the E.U. will begin to consider these questions in depth in
the future.
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